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Abstract  
This article critically examines the 1983 British Columbia (BC) Solidarity experience, a 
period that marked the first comprehensive neoliberal policy revolution in Canada. It 
also marked the launch of an extensive movement of extra‐parliamentary resistance to 
neoliberal attempts to undo social and economic gains achieved during the period of 
Keynesian consensus. The character of this progressive movement of trade unions, 
social groups and civil society was however limited to “defensive defiance”. A number 
of questions are posed such as: What was the nature of the resistance to neoliberalism 
in BC in 1983, and to what extent did it succeed?  Leftist analysts hotly debated these 
questions at the time, and a review in hindsight of their views is instructive. And to 
what degree have the neoliberal agenda and strategy and tactics changed in the 
ensuing years? Our review in this article suggests both a remarkable continuity and 
some fundamental changes. Analysis of these events therefore remains historically 
relevant to those concerned with pan‐Canadian political trends. 
 
Résumé 
Cet article fait une analyse critique de l’expérience du mouvement de Solidarity en 
1983 en Colombie Britannique, à une période qui a marqué la première révolution 
néolibérale complète au Canada. Ce moment a également signalé le début d’un 
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mouvement important de résistance extra‐parlementaire aux efforts néolibéraux de 
déconstruction des acquis sociaux et économiques  qui ont été gagnés pendant la 
période du consensus keynésien. Le caractère de ce mouvement rassemblant des 
syndicats, certains groupes sociaux et des membres de la société civile était cependant 
limité à une ‘défiance défensive’. Plusieurs questions sont posées, parmi lesquelles: 
Quelle est la nature de la résistance au néolibéralisme en Colombie Britannique en 
1983 et à quel point a‐t‐elle réussi? Des analystes de gauche ont vivement débattu de 
ces questions à l’époque et une revue rétrospective de leurs débats est utile. Dans 
quelle mesure le programme et la stratégie/tactique néolibérale ont‐ils changé dans les 
années qui ont suivi? Notre rétrospective dans cet article suggère à la fois une 
continuité remarquable et quelques changements fondamentaux. Une analyse de ces 
évènements reste historiquement pertinente pour ceux et celles qui s’intéressent aux 
développements politiques au Canada. 
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This	article	looks	back	at	the	experience	of	the	Solidarity	movement	in	
British	Columbia	(BC)	in	1983,	when	that	province	was	engaged	in	
Canada’s	first	extensive	neoliberal	transformation.	The	outcome	of	that	
struggle	would	be	watched	closely,	and	would	help	to	shape	the	policy	
agendas	of	governments	as	well	as	the	popular	resistance	across	the	
country	for	decades	to	come.	Our	paper	reviews	the	main	events	and	the	
key	contemporary	comment	of	engaged	activists	and	academics.	It	also	
provides	some	reflections	on	the	lessons	of	this	struggle	for	those	who	
continue	to	oppose	neoliberal	globalization.	Rather	than	reinterpreting	the	
insights	of	those	who	provided	critical	analysis	at	the	time	of	Solidarity,	we	
have	attempted	to	succinctly	but	accurately	summarize	their	views,	and	to	
add	our	own	analysis	on	their	relevance	today.	Our	paper	seeks	to	re‐visit	
Solidarity	and	the	neoliberal	moment	that	brought	it	into	existence	in	
order	to	better	understand	this	formative	event’s	significance	in	relation	to	
the	advance	of	neoliberalism	in	Canada,	and	the	on‐going	progressive	
opposition	to	it.	
The	right	wing	agenda	of	the	Social	Credit	(Socred)	government	in	
BC	shook	the	socio‐economic	fabric	of	the	province.	A	dissident	political	
consciousness	began	to	awaken;	at	the	same	time	the	popular	mobilization	
alarmed	other	segments	of	the	population	and	pushed	them	into	the	
government’s	camp.	By	November	1983,	BC	was	in	a	state	of	political	crisis,	
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and	society	had	become	polarized	to	a	degree	unknown	since	the	Great	
Depression	of	the	1930s.	
What	was	the	nature	of	the	resistance	to	neoliberalism	in	BC	in	
1983,	and	to	what	extent	did	it	succeed?	Analysts	on	the	left	hotly	debated	
these	questions	at	the	time,	and	a	review	in	hindsight	of	their	views	may	be	
instructive.	To	what	degree	have	the	neoliberal	agenda,	strategy	and	tactics	
changed	in	the	ensuing	years?	Our	review	in	this	paper	suggests	both	a	
remarkable	continuity	and	some	fundamental	changes.	
Analysis	of	these	events	therefore	remains	historically	relevant	to	
those	concerned	with	pan‐Canadian	political	trends.	More	particularly,	this	
analysis	provides	some	perspective	and	possibly	some	insights	for	those	
who	continue	to	resist	the	process	of	neoliberal	globalization,	which	has	
continued	for	decades	–	often	in	new	forms	–	following	the	Solidarity	
experience	in	BC.	
	
Setting the Scene: Neoliberalism Comes to BC 
The	introduction	in	1983	of	a	provincial	budget	along	with	a	sweeping	set	
of	26	legislative	bills	by	the	Socred	Government	of	William	Bennett	was	
unprecedented	in	its	scope	and	in	its	shifting	of	policy	agendas	and	
discourse	to	the	political	right.	It	represented	a	deliberate	frontal	assault	
on	many	of	the	foundations	of	the	established	broad	Keynesian	social	and	
political	consensus	in	the	province	and	within	Canada.	Even	for	a	right‐of‐
centre	populist	party,	which	the	Socreds	represented,	in	a	province	with	a	
rather	rich	history	of	left‐right	political	divisions	(Resnick	2000),	this	was	a	
bold	and	provocative	move	by	a	government	intent	on	imposing,	what	until	
then,	was	a	“hidden”	neoliberal	ideological	policy	agenda	(Resnick	1986,	
22).	
Fresh	from	an	election	victory	in	1983	over	its	social	democratic	
NDP	rivals,	the	Socred	Government	introduced	its	budget	and	legislative	
agenda.	While	the	need	for	restraint	was	a	Socred	theme	during	the	
election,	no	hint	of	the	extent	and	depth	of	change	was	discussed	during	
the	campaign,	so	the	content	of	1983	budget	came	as	a	surprise	to	the	
province	(Block	1984,	8;	and	Kinsella	1985,	11‐12).	
The	1983	Budget	measures	were	not	about	cutting	government	
costs	in	the	immediate	term,	as	the	recession	of	the	early	1980s	had	
generated	budget	deficits.	Rather	they	were	about	establishing	the	
framework	and	momentum	for	redrawing	the	public	policy	agenda	away	
from	social	expenditures	and	other	legitimation	functions	of	the	state	
toward	areas	that	would	help	liberate	market	forces,	and	create	a	climate	
very	favourable	to	capital	accumulation	and	business	investment.	These	
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included	deregulation,	lower	corporate	taxes	and	constraining	the	power	
of	trade	unions.	The	Fraser	Institute's	Michael	Walker	tellingly	suggested	
that	the	budget	was	a	beachhead	designed	to	open	up	the	ideological	
struggle	to	downsize	government	(Mcintosh	1983,	C7).	
The	Government's	claim	that	the	budget	deficit	was	structural	
rather	than	cyclical	added	weight	to	their	position	regarding	the	need	for	a	
major	rethinking	and	reorientation	of	state	spending	(Redish	and	Schworm	
1986),	a	position	which	would	be	usefully	employed	by	subsequent	
neoliberal	governments	in	Canada	(Lewis	2003).	Bennett	argued	that	this	
“new	economic	reality”	required	government	to	“take	a	common	sense”	
and	“practical	approach”	to	state	spending	and	to	manage	state	finances	
more	like	the	family	budget	(Bennett	1983,	1188;	BC	Budget	1982,	2).	This	
BC	version	of	the	common	sense	revolution	included	not	just	bringing	in	
balanced	budgets,	but	creating	a	more	balanced	society	where	the	state's	
role	was	greatly	reduced,	and	the	private	market	enhanced	and	allowed	to	
work	its	creative	and	productive	powers.	
Tactically	the	Socreds	chose	to	implement	their	neoliberal	agenda	
through	what	Allan	Garr	termed	the	“big‐bang	strategy”.	This	strategy	
consisted	of	introducing	the	core	elements	of	their	program	in	one	
comprehensive	package	without	forwarning.	By	failing	to	engage	in	a	
process	of	broad	consultation	on	the	policy	changes	and	decisively	
attacking	a	broad	range	of	interests	at	once,	the	government	felt	that	the	
opposition	would	be	caught	off	guard	and	be	unable	to	organize	an	
effective	resistance	(Garr	1985,	260).	
Aside	from	the	broader	goals	of	the	measures	identified	above,	the	
Budget	and	the	accompanying	26	Bills	could	be	broken	down	into	four	
distinct	categories:	1)	measures	designed	to	strip	collective	bargaining	
rights	from	public	sector	workers	and	to	shrink	their	numbers;	2)	statutes	
which	rolled	back	renter	and	human	rights;	3)	policies	aimed	at	
dismantling	various	other	publically	supported	social	and	human	services;	
and,	4)	measures	that	centralized	power	in	the	hands	of	the	cabinet	so	that	
they	would	be	given	a	freer	hand	to	make	“necessary”	policy	decisions	or	
handle	dissent	(Shields	1989,	256).	
The	totality	of	these	measures	fit	well	with	generic	neoliberal	
principles.	Broadly,	neoliberal	aims	have	been	centred	on	shrinking	the	
state	and	restoring	the	market	since	“government	failure”	is	seen	as	the	
chief	cause	of	economic	and	social	problems.	This	shift	was	particularly	
targeted	against	Keynesian	regulatory	and	social	policies,	in	favour	of	more	
neo‐classical	economic	laissez‐faire	orientations.	Moreover,	neoliberalism	
seeks	to	redefine	citizenship	rights	away	from	its	more	inclusive	social	and	
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economic	dimensions	as	encompassed	in	the	Keynesian	social	contract	to	a	
narrower	“lean”	form	of	citizenship	–	a	market	based	citizenship	–	stripped	
of	collective	socio‐economic	rights	content	(Burke,	Mooers,	and	Shields	
2000,	12‐13).	Additionally,	neoliberalism	is	about	shaping	public	policy	
alignment	with	the	interests	of	global	capitalism,	and	in	this	regard	we	are	
said	to	have	no	alternative	but	to	adjust	to	the	logical	of	neoliberal	
globalization	because	of	structural	economic	pressures	(Saad‐Filho	and	
Johnston,	2005).	Finally,	“special	interests”	empowered	by	the	Keynesian	
welfare	state	(unions,	public	sector	bureaucrats,	the	liberal	media	and	
intellectual	elite,	etc.)	must	be	checked	to	control	their	excessive	power	
and	contain	their	demands	on	the	state	for	special	rights	and	benefits.	This	
has	created,	according	to	neoliberals,	demand	overload	resulting	in	state	
fiscal	crisis	and	a	more	generalized	problem	of	a	“crisis	of	democracy”,	as	
state	capacities	became	overwhelmed	(McBride	and	Shields	1997,	28‐29;	
Crozier	et	al.	1975,	6‐12).	
It	is	important	to	note	that	BC	was	a	particularly	receptive	host	to	
neoliberal	ideals	because	it	did	have	the	sharpest	left‐right	divisions	in	the	
country	(Howlett	and	Brownsey	1988),	and	because	the	business	
community	had	organized	in	resistance	to	the	threat	of	another	NDP	
government,	which	had	held	power	from	1972‐75.	They	did	this	by	not	
only	actively	supporting	the	Socreds,	but	also	by	financing	the	
establishment	the	Vancouver‐based	Fraser	Institute	which	since	the	1970s	
had	become	an	incubator	of	right	wing	thinking	and	a	popularizer	of	its	
neoliberal	ideas.	The	Fraser	Institute's	stated	purpose	was	to	work	for	the	
“redirection	of	public	attention	to	the	role	of	competitive	markets	in	
providing	for	the	well‐being	of	Canadians”	(Ohashi	and	Roth	1980,	inside	
front	cover).	The	Fraser	Institute	was	one	of	the	few	groups	the	
government	consulted	concerning	the	1983	Budget.	The	high	praise	given	
by	the	Institute	for	the	government's	measures	in	1983	is	indicative	of	both	
the	neoliberal	content	of	the	Socred's	agenda	and	the	influence	of	the	
Institute	over	government	policy	thinking.	The	Institute's	leading	figure	
Michael	Walker	(1983,	8)	called	the	budget	in	approving	tones	a	“little	
revolution”	(Mcintosh	1983,	C7).	As	Walker	noted,	Premier	Bennett	had	
“turn[ed]	on	its	head...the	acceptable	notion	of	what	was	politically	
possible	and	acceptable	for	governments	to	do.”	The	political	right	in	
Canada,	linked	into	a	larger	international	network,	had	nurtured	the	
development	of	think	tanks	as	part	of	a	longer‐term	strategy	to	win	the	
battle	of	ideas	(Brownlee	2005)	that	was	necessary	to	unseat	the	
hegemony	of	the	Keynesian	policy	paradigm.	
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Since	Canadian	governance	is	characterized	by	federalism	where	
regional	governments	possess	considerable	power,	what	happens	in	the	
provinces	is	significant	for	policy	learning	in	other	Canadian	jurisdictions.	
In	earlier	periods	progressive	social	policy	had	spread	out	from	provinces	
like	Saskatchewan	under	social	democratic	government	as	in	the	case	of	
medicare.	In	the	1980s	BC	would	become	a	learning	laboratory	for	
neoliberal	policy	innovation.		
	
A Brief History of the Political Mobilization 
The	sweeping	neoliberal	agenda	represented	by	the	1983	budget	and	
legislative	measures	generated	strong	reaction.	In	particular,	it	led	to	the	
rapid	creation	of	an	extra‐parliamentary	opposition,	which	marched	under	
the	banner	of	Solidarity.	BC's	right	wing	neoliberal	revolution	generated	in	
true	Polanyian	fashion	a	“double	movement”	(Polanyi	2001)	by	a	
progressive	opposition,	a	political	protest	movement	unlike	any	other	in	
the	history	of	the	province.	
The	Socred	government’s	1983	budget	“revolution”	generated	a	
reaction	of	initial	disbelief,	tension	and	a	measure	of	disorganization	as	the	
NDP,	the	media,	trade	unions	and	community	groups	struggled	to	grasp	
what	it	all	meant	and	to	absorb	the	enormity	of	the	changes	(Kieran	1983,	
A2).	It	was	the	Socreds'	intention	to	radically	alter	the	balance	between	the	
public	and	private	sectors,	and	dismantle	rights,	which	quite	naturally	
aroused	strong	reactions.	
The	NDP,	as	Her	Majesty’s	Loyal	Opposition,	was	the	first	to	oppose	
the	government.	It	was	a	vocal	critic	of	the	restraint	program,	working	
actively	to	resist	its	implementation.	However,	its	struggle	against	the	
legislation	was	waged	strictly	as	a	parliamentary	battle.	The	NDP	utilized	
every	avenue	and	tactic	in	its	legislative	arsenal	in	an	attempt	to	block,	or	
at	least	delay	for	as	long	as	possible,	the	passage	of	the	most	offensive	
statutes.	
The	Socreds	were,	however,	able	to	blunt	the	effectiveness	of	this	
opposition	through	the	use	(or	misuse)	of	parliamentary	procedures	such	
as	marathon	sessions,	closure	and	eventually	the	physical	expulsion	of	the	
leader	of	the	opposition.	In	a	province	with	a	history	of	rough	and	tumble	
politics	both	inside	and	outside	the	Legislature,	the	July	1983	legislative	
session	presented	a	special	challenge	to	democratic	parliamentary	
practice.	In	order	to	push	its	26	bills	through	the	legislature,	the	Socred	
government	adopted	a	practice	of	legislation	by	exhaustion	without	the	
opportunity	for	substantive	debate.	Closure,	not	used	in	BC	since	1957,	
was	invoked	no	less	than	20	times	(Wilson	1984,	123,	126).	The	
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government’s	unwilling	to	moderate	in	the	face	of	intense	parliamentary	
resistance,	however,	showed	the	limitations	of	representative	democratic	
institutions,	revealing	legislatures	to	be,	in	this	instance,	simply	“talk	
shops”	(Yandle	1984,	5).	
Outside	of	the	Legislature	the	reaction	to	the	Socreds'	intransigence	
was	a	degree	of	protest	and	popular	mobilization	that	illustrated	the	gulf	
that	had	come	to	separate	the	population	from	the	government	and	its	so‐
called	“restraint”	program.	The	mood	of	frustration	and	anger	displayed	by	
public	sector	workers	such	as	the	disgruntled	BC	teachers	(Ballard,	1983)	
over	the	government’s	refusal	to	moderate	its	sweeping	“restraint”	
program,	even	in	the	face	of	massive	disapproval,	expressed	how	deeply	
the	1983	Budget	touched	and	activated	even	normally	non‐political	British	
Columbians.	Government	supporters,	on	the	other	hand,	construed	
Solidarity	as	not	only	a	disruptive	force	but	a	potential	threat	to	
democratic	government	itself	(Mulgrew	1983,	4).	
This	non‐institutionalized	form	of	opposition	took	the	form	of	“the	
broadest	social	movement	in	the	province’s	history”	(Diamond	1984,	268).	
Historically	the	BC	union	movement	has	a	tradition	of	militancy	and	
political	activism,	often	providing	a	core	of	mobilization	around	which	
community	groups	could	coalesce	(Carroll	1984,	110).	But	the	Solidarity	
movement	grew	rapidly	into	something	more	than	an	adjunct	to	labour	
mobilization,	setting	new	directions	for	progressive	struggle	in	the	
province.	
The	Solidarity	movement	developed	as	separate	but	coordinated	
networks	of	both	labour	and	community	organizations.	One	wing	of	the	
movement	was	Operation	Solidarity,	the	trade	union	element.	It	was	an	
organization	founded	by	the	province’s	central	labour	organization,	the	BC	
Federation	of	Labour	(BC	Fed).	Operation	Solidarity,	however,	looked	
beyond	its	own	Federation	membership	and	sought	to	speak	for	nearly	
every	organized	worker	in	the	province.	
The	other	wing	of	the	protest	movement	was	rooted	in	community	
organizations	and	broader	community	concern.	The	Solidarity	Coalition	
invited	under	its	umbrella	any	group	or	organization	in	BC	that	opposed	
the	Socreds’	budget	and	legislative	package.	It	was	comprised	of	a	broad	
spectrum	of	interests	ranging	from	professionals	to	the	unemployed,	
consumers	to	small	business,	feminists	to	ethnic	minorities,	
environmentalists	as	well	as	the	disabled,	in	short,	the	so‐called	
community	group	elements	within	civil	society	(Solidarity	Coalition	
Bulletin	1983,	2‐3).	The	political	range	within	this	component	of	Solidarity	
was	consequently	also	very	broad,	ranging	from	real	progressive	
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conservatives	to	communist	and	anarchistic	elements,	united	by	what	they	
opposed	rather	than	a	particular	alternative	vision.	
On	15	July	BC	Fed	President	Art	Kube	organized	a	conference	
inviting	both	Federation‐affiliated	and	non‐affiliated	unions.	This	was	key	
to	building	an	alliance	with	the	more	than	75,000	public	sector	unions	
representing	teachers,	hospital	workers	and	nurses.	The	conference	
represented	the	birth	of	Operation	Solidarity,	the	labour	wing	of	the	
Solidarity	movement	(Pacific	Tribune	1983,	1).	
The	first	popular	organization	to	arise	in	reaction	to	the	
government’s	moves	was	the	Lower	Mainland	Budget	Coalition	(LMBC).	It	
was	the	creation	of	the	Vancouver	and	District	Labour	Council’s	
Unemployment	Action	Centre	and	representatives	from	over	fifty	
community	groups	and	unions	in	the	city	(Carroll	1984,	96).	Labour	
leaders	and	members	of	the	Communist	party	were	instrumental	in	initial	
organizing,	but	the	impetus	came	from	hundreds	of	community	members	
angered	by	the	Socred	agenda.	
The	LMBC	adopted	the	operating	principle	that	“an	injury	to	one	is	
an	injury	to	all”,	and	made	itself	open	to	all	organizations	committed	to	
defeating	the	Socred	budget	and	legislative	program	and	fighting	for	the	
defence	and	enhancement	of	economic,	democratic	and	human	rights	
(Lower	Mainland	Budget	Coalition	n.d.).	The	Budget	Coalition	organized	a	
rally	on	short	notice	for	23	July,	and	drew	an	estimated	25,000	supporters,	
surpassing	the	expectations	of	even	the	most	optimistic	(Solidarity	Times	
1983,	5).	
By	the	end	of	July	the	two	structures	joined	together	politically	
under	the	Solidarity	banner.	Operation	Solidarity	was	the	main	trade	union	
wing	of	the	movement,	under	the	direction	of	the	BC	Fed.	Every	major	BC	
community	also	had	a	local	Solidarity	Coalition,	although	the	largest	by	far	
was	the	Lower	Mainland	Solidarity	Coalition	(originally	the	Lower	
Mainland	Budget	Coalition).	Some	unions	were	active	in	the	locally	based	
Solidarity	coalitions,	particularly	the	Canadian	unions	not	affiliated	with	
the	BC	Fed.	
The	remade	Solidarity	movement	devised	a	three‐phase	campaign	
of	action	designed	to	pressure	the	government	into	retreating	on	the	
legislation.	Phase	one	would	encompass	mass	rallies.	Phase	two	would	
diversify	the	protest	and	pressure	tactics.	The	second	phase	included	
placing	legislative	pressure	on	the	government	by	supporting	NDP	
filibustering,	having	a	continuous	Solidarity	presence	at	the	Legislature,	
filling	the	gallery	during	debates,	and	contacting	individual	Socred	MLAs.	
Also	organized	as	part	of	phase	two	was	a	“Speak	Out”	campaign	with	a	
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petition	and	buttons	to	wear	to	work.	As	well,	attention	would	be	focused	
on	particular	issues	like	human	rights,	or	education,	during	particular	
weeks.	The	final	phase	of	action	would	involve	public	sector	bargaining,	
and	industrial	action,	although	the	direction	this	would	take	was	not	
immediately	clear	(Kuehn	1983,	1).	
Within	Operation	Solidarity,	there	was	considerable	discussion	
about	the	plans	for	gradually	escalating	strikes,	and	the	related	issues	of	
legal	and	illegal	strikes,	and	direct	political	action.	At	the	founding	of	
Operation	Solidarity,	the	BC	Fed	leader	Art	Kube	had	rejected	the	notion	of	
a	full‐fledged	general	strike.	Union	leaders	and	activists	were	also	
preoccupied	with	maintaining	support	from	the	media	and	the	general	
public.	
Meanwhile	the	Socred	government	responded	with	its	own	tactics	
to	counter	the	plan	of	action	from	Operation	Solidarity	–	suspending	the	
legislature	for	a	“cooling	off”	period,	postponing	some	scheduled	layoffs,	
and	making	deals	with	particular	unions.	They	also	escalated	their	
rhetorical	denunciation	of	the	Solidarity	movement,	and	threats	of	punitive	
action	against	the	unions	and	their	leaders.	Nevertheless,	union	opposition	
to	the	government	continued	to	grow,	particularly	in	terms	of	opposition	
to	Bill	3,	which	aimed	to	slash	the	size	of	the	civil	service.	Despite	attempts	
at	dividing	the	teachers’	union	and	their	strike	plans,	between	80	and	90	
percent	of	the	members	joined	a	strike	called	by	their	leaders	(McLintock	
1983,	27).	
In	the	late	summer	and	fall	of	1983	the	growing	numbers	at	
Solidarity‐organized	demonstrations	showed	the	gathering	public	support	
for	the	movement.	A	major	rally	at	Vancouver’s	Empire	Stadium	on	10	
August	drew	more	than	40,000;	effectively	this	was	a	short	public	sector	
general	strike	as	workers	left	their	jobs	to	join	in.	The	demonstration	on	15	
October	turned	into	the	largest	anti‐government	mobilization	in	BC	
history,	with	between	50,000	and	60,000	people	marching	past	the	Socred	
Party’s	annual	convention	in	downtown	Vancouver	(Sarti	1983,	A16).	At	
the	rallying	point	Solidarity	presented	“A	Declaration	of	Rights	of	the	
People	of	British	Columbia”,	a	charter	that	endorsed	as	fundamental	the	
sanctity	of	the	very	rights	the	government	was	attempting	to	dismantle.	BC	
Solidarity	had	developed	into	a	major	social	movement.	
In	November	of	1983	the	titanic	struggle	between	Solidarity	and	the	
government	climaxed	in	an	escalating	public	sector	strike.	A	settlement	
was	reached,	the	so‐called	“Kelowna	Accord”,	only	hours	before	an	
ultimate	and	seemingly	irreversible	showdown	was	to	occur.		Except	for	
the	resolution	of	a	formal	contract	dispute	with	the	BC	Government	
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Employees	Union	(BCGEU),	the	Kelowna	Accord	was	a	verbal	deal	between	
representatives	of	the	Socred	government	and	the	union	leaders	of	
Operation	Solidarity.	Interpretation	of	the	deal	was	therefore	subject	to	
possible	misunderstanding	or	further	negotiation.			
In	essence	the	Kelowna	Accord	provided	for	the	following	according	
to	Operation	Solidarity:		
 The	BCGEU	settlement	would	exempt	the	union	from	Bill	3,	and	this	
contract	provision	would	serve	as	a	model	for	the	exemption	of	
other	unions	from	Bill	3.	This	Bill	essentially	gave	government	a	free	
hand	to	lay	off	workers	without	regard	to	negotiated	contract	
provisions	such	as	seniority;	
 Bill	2,	the	Public	Service	Labour	Relations	Amendment	Act,	would	
be	allowed	to	die	on	the	order	paper.	This	Bill	would	have	stripped	
the	right	of	the	union	to	negotiate,	anything	other	than	wages,	terms	
and	conditions	of	work	with	their	employer;	
 No	reprisals	would	be	directed	against	any	of	the	strikers	or	their	
unions;	
 There	would	be	ministerial	consultation	with	respect	to	rent	control	
legislation;	
 There	would	be	advisory	commissions	established	for	the	purpose	
of	public	consultation	on	Human	Rights	and	Labour	Code	legislative	
changes;		
 Consultation	mechanisms	would	be	established	for	individuals	and	
groups	for	the	purpose	of	proposing	alternative	budget	priority	
suggestions;	and	
 Money	saved	on	teachers’	salaries	during	the	strike	would	be	
returned	to	the	education	budget,	purportedly	to	avert	the	necessity	
of	teacher	layoffs	(Larkin	1984,	6).	
The	last	point	of	the	agreement	caused	conflict	over	the	next	few	months,	
with	the	government	demanding	that	teachers	make	up	the	three	work	
days	lost	during	the	strike	before	any	savings	would	be	returned	to	the	
school	system.	Operation	Solidarity	threatened	to	reactivate	the	strike	but	
practically	this	was	not	possible,	and	the	government	interpretation	
prevailed.	However,	the	Kelowna	Accord	provided	important	victories	for	
Operation	Solidarity	and	its	supporters	in	relation	to	two	of	the	most	
offensive	pieces	of	the	proposed	labour	legislation.	Public	sector	unions	
were	allowed	to	preserve	the	principle	of	seniority	rights	through	
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exemptions	to	Bill	3,	and	the	withdrawal	of	Bill	2	allowed	the	BCGEU	to	
maintain	bargaining	rights	over	multiple	issues	–	critical	to	the	
preservation	of	“free”	collective	bargaining.	
None	of	the	labour	leaders	saw	the	Kelowna	Accord	as	an	
unmitigated	victory;	the	most	optimistic	spoke	in	terms	of	limited	and	
symbolic	gains	–	the	defeat	of	key	pieces	of	legislation,	and	the	building	of	
solidarity	and	struggle.	The	labour	leaders	also	believed	that	they	had	
made	some	progress	on	the	social	issues	of	most	concern	to	their	partners	
in	the	Solidarity	Coalition.	There	were	intense	debates	within	organized	
labour	over	the	use	of	“political	strikes”,	and	a	future	orientation	towards	
business	or	social	unionism.	But	these	remained	largely	internal	to	the	
trade	union	movement.	
The	dissatisfaction	of	the	Solidarity	Coalition	with	the	Kelowna	
Accord,	however,	was	more	public.	Many	of	its	spokespersons	publicly	
chastised	Operation	Solidarity	for	its	failure	to	consult	with	its	coalition	
partners,	and	for	labour’s	failure	to	stay	on	the	picket	lines	until	resolution	
of	the	concerns	of	the	community	groups.	Many	within	the	Solidarity	
Coalition	viewed	these	omissions	as	a	betrayal	by	the	labour	leadership	
(Glavin	1983,	A1).	The	situation	was	aggravated	by	the	unfortunate	fact	
that	the	main	Operation	Solidarity	leader	Art	Kube,	who	had	facilitated	
much	of	the	on‐going	communications	between	organized	labour	and	
community	representatives,	fell	ill	during	the	negotiations	of	the	Kelowna	
Accord	and	withdrew	from	the	negotiations.	Nevertheless,	it	was	clear	that	
the	leaders	of	Operation	Solidarity	had	given	only	cosmetic	treatment	to	
the	main	concerns	of	their	community	partners,	such	as	human	and	tenant	
rights.	That	the	union	leaders	saw	these	as	“political”	issues	to	be	resolved	
through	the	ballot	box	revealed	the	depth	of	differences	between	the	two	
wings	of	the	movement.	
After	the	Kelowna	accord,	Solidarity	passed	from	a	mass	extra‐
parliamentary	opposition	movement	to	a	much	smaller	and	more	
institutionalized	government	watchdog	organization.	In	spite	of	a	sense	of	
betrayal	by	their	union	partners,	the	Solidarity	Coalition	vowed	to	continue	
the	battle	around	social	issues	and	human	rights.		
Solidarity	remained	an	active	critic	of	the	Socred	government,	
becoming	a	continuing	source	of	media	attention	as	a	counter	to	
government	policy	on	labour	and	social	issues.	The	experience	also	
developed	a	new	level	of	collaboration	and	unity	in	the	BC	trade	union	
movement,	particularly	between	private	and	public	sector	unions,	a	unity	
that	would	become	very	important	in	the	unions	struggle	in	1987	against	
an	attempt	to	overhaul	the	BC	Labour	Code	along	neoliberal	lines.	This	
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unity	was	maintained	through	active	communications	and	collaboration	in	
the	years	immediately	following	1983.	No	doubt	influenced	by	the	tensions	
between	the	community	sector	and	organized	labour	as	a	result	of	the	
Solidarity	experience	the	battle	against	the	sweeping	1987	BC	labour	code	
changes	took	the	form	of	a	union	directed	and	focused	boycott	which	to	a	
large	degree	effectively	negated	the	worst	aspects	of	the	legislative	
changes	(Shields	1991).	
	
Analysis of the Events 
	
Interpretations	by	Left‐Wing	Analysts	
The	dramatic	experience	of	the	Solidarity	movement	and	its	confrontation	
with	the	BC	Socred	government	quite	naturally	gave	rise	to	considerable	
commentary	by	left‐wing	analysts.	The	most	extensive	account	came	from	
historian	Bryan	Palmer,	who	saw	a	movement	with	exhilarating	potential	
led	to	a	crushing	defeat	by	its	leaders.	Palmer’s	analysis	focused	on	the	role	
of	the	labour	bureaucracy	and	social	democratic	reformism	in	the	downfall	
of	Solidarity.		He	highlighted	in	particular:	
 Insufficient	or	even	false	information	provided	by	the	movement’s	
leaders	to	its	supporters,	and	their	role	in	demobilizing	or	limiting	
mass	action;	
 The	suspicion	and	fear	of	the	NDP	in	relation	to	any	mass	movement	
outside	the	parliamentary	arena;	and,	
 The	resistance	of	the	labour	leadership	in	BC	to	engagement	in	
grassroots	militant	and	revolutionary	working	class	struggle.	
For	Palmer,	the	Solidarity	movement	could	have	won	great	victories	if	the	
leaders	had	not	sabotaged	its	evolution	towards	a	general	strike	(Palmer	
1987,	88‐103).	
Maurice	Rush	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Canada	provided	a	more	
favourable	assessment	of	the	Solidarity	experience,	emphasizing	the	gains	
that	were	achieved,	the	historic	significance	of	the	trade	union	leaders’	
engagement	in	extra‐parliamentary	struggle	(led	by	the	public	sector	
unions),	and	the	enduring	legacy	of	united	popular	struggle	(1984,	10).	
Philip	Resnick’s	observations	challenged	those	like	Palmer	who	saw	
potential	victory	through	a	general	strike.	Resnick	questioned	the	
prospects	of	a	prolonged	public	sector	strike	without	substantial	private	
sector	union	engagement,	and	noted	the	risk	of	driving	public	opinion	into	
the	Socred's	camp.	For	Resnick	the	victory	of	Solidarity	was	in	the	struggle	
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itself.	The	movement	showed	that	a	neo‐conservative/neoliberal	agenda	
could	not	be	implemented	with	impunity	in	BC,	or	presumably	in	the	rest	
of	Canada	(1986,	34).	William	Carroll	viewed	the	Solidarity	experience	as	a	
limited	and	defensive	reaction	to	a	neo‐conservative/neoliberal	revolution	
in	BC.	For	Carroll	the	conservatism	and	bureaucratic	habits	of	the	union	
leaders	were	too	entrenched	to	permit	them	to	lead	and	win	the	militant	
struggle	that	was	required.	However,	the	grassroots	organizations	in	the	
Solidarity	Coalition,	representing	the	community	sector	of	the	movement,	
had	more	potential	to	develop	a	counter‐hegemonic	force	opposing	the	
neoliberal	agenda.	The	failure	to	achieve	this	goal	was	due	to	a	number	of	
key	weaknesses	in	the	left	opposition:	
 The	organizational	divisions	and	communication	gaps	between	the	
two	wings	of	the	movement;	
 A	lack	of	priorities	in	the	movement’s	opposition	to	the	government	
legislation,	leading	to	an	inability	to	impose	a	reasonable	
compromise	as	dictated	by	political	necessity;	
 The	split	between	“trade	union”	and	“social/political”	issues	within	
the	movement;	and,	
 Solidarity’s	failure	to	articulate	and	discuss	a	social	alternative	to	
neoliberalism.	
Carroll	concluded	that	these	weaknesses	resulted	in	the	BC	left	reverting	to	
old‐style	Keynesian	solutions	after	the	Solidarity	experience,	while	
neoliberalism	became	the	dominant	ideological	force	(Carroll	1984,	104;	
Carroll	1987).	
	
Review	of	the	Left	Analysis	
Given	the	nature	of	the	economic	and	political	forces	within	which	the	
Solidarity	movement	developed,	what	should	we	think	in	retrospect	of	the	
analysis	provided	by	contemporary	left	observers?	Was	Solidarity	a	failure	
or	success?	What	forces	strengthened	or	weakened	the	movement?	What	
role	did	the	labour	leadership,	and	the	fragile	alliance	between	unions	and	
community	groups	play?	And	what	did	the	Socred	government,	and	other	
neoliberal	forces	across	Canada,	learn	from	the	experience?	
Palmer	argued	that	both	labour	and	community	groups	were	
betrayed	by	reformist	union	bureaucrats	who	would	not	or	could	not	lead	
the	class	struggle.	While	there	is	no	doubt	that	the	BC	trade	union	leaders	
were	reformist	and	social	democratic,	it	is	not	so	clear	that	the	majority	of	
rank‐and‐file	union	leaders	were	more	class	conscious	or	potentially	
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revolutionary.	And	what	evidence	do	we	have	that	a	constant	escalation	of	
tactics	and	political	demands	–	culminating	in	a	general	strike	for	the	
complete	abolition	of	all	the	Socred	legislation	–	would	have	produced	
victory	for	the	popular	movement	rather	than	a	political	crisis	ultimately	
consolidating	the	power	of	the	Socred	government?	
Both	Rush	and	Resnick	provided	relevant	responses	to	Palmer’s	
perspective.	Rush	observes	that	the	BC	trade	union	leaders	did	in	fact	
engage	in	a	degree	of	extra‐parliamentary	struggle	that	while	ultimately	
perhaps	too	constrained,	went	far	beyond	the	limits	of	previous	struggles.	
And	Resnick	questioned	the	possibility	of	achieving	victory	for	all	of	
Solidarity’s	demands	through	a	general	strike,	given	the	ambiguity	of	
public	opinion	towards	general	strikes	in	liberal	democracies.	Both	Rush	
and	Resnick	suggested	–	correctly	we	believe	–	that	the	Solidarity	
experience	could	not	be	accurately	labelled	as	either	a	victory	or	a	failure.	
The	Solidarity	movement	at	a	minimum	had	demonstrated	that	popular	
forces	in	BC	were	willing	to	“unite	and	fight”	against	the	radical	right‐wing	
agenda.	
Of	all	the	authors	who	provided	critical	reviews	of	the	Solidarity	
experience,	Carroll	provided	the	analysis	which	best	stands	the	test	of	
time.	He	correctly	identified	the	limited	and	defensive	character	of	the	
opposition	to	the	imposition	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	in	BC.	He	also	
recognized	the	importance	of	the	numerous	displays	of	militancy	displayed	
in	the	struggle.	Finally,	and	most	importantly,	Carroll	identified	the	
opposition’s	failure	to	develop	its	own	program	as	a	counter	hegemonic	
force	to	the	neoliberal	policy	agenda.	In	this	context	it	is	worth	recalling	
Piven	and	Cloward's	(1979,	xiii)	observation	that:	“What	was	won	must	be	
judged	by	what	was	possible.”	
In	retrospect	it	seems	evident	that	Palmer	did	raise	an	important	
point	regarding	the	failure	of	the	leadership	in	the	union	movement,	as	
demonstrated	by	its	inability	to	move	beyond	narrow	trade	union	
consciousness.	Such	movement	would	be	required	to	build	a	counter	
hegemonic	paradigm,	beyond	the	obvious	limits	of	Keynesianism,	to	
neoliberalism.	However,	this	was	a	more	generalized	problem	among	
progressive	forces	that	limited	popular	mobilization	in	resistance	to	
neoliberalism	to	a	decidedly	defensive	posture,	and	also	made	it	difficult	to	
compete	effectively	with	neoliberal	forces	in	the	larger	term	battle	of	ideas.	
What	the	Solidarity	experience	did	reveal	was	that	a	new	era	of	
politics	had	arisen	for	British	Columbia,	and	ultimately	of	course	across	
Canada	and	globally.	It	was	characterized	by	the	appearance	of	mass	extra‐
parliamentary	resistance	to	the	emerging	and	fundamental	shift	in	state	
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policies,	and	by	the	scramble	of	popular	forces	to	develop	alliances	and	
strategies	capable	or	resisting	the	erosion	of	the	Keynesian	welfare	state.	
	
The Significance of the Solidarity Experience 
	
Plus	Ça	Change…	
Looking	back	on	the	Solidarity	experience,	it	is	striking	to	see	how	little	the	
core	aims	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	have	changed.	The	erosion	of	the	
welfare	state	and	related	workers’	and	human	rights	have	remained	
central	to	the	agenda	of	both	provincial	and	federal	governments	for	the	
nearly	three	decades	since	the	trade	unions	and	community	groups	of	BC	
challenged	the	ruling	Socred	government.	Many	of	the	methods	of	
imposing	these	changes	have	remained	constant	as	well,	from	the	
disruption	of	basic	parliamentary	procedures,	to	the	harsh	criticism	of	the	
opposition	as	enemies	of	democracy	and	economic	progress.	
Much	has	changed	in	this	time	of	course,	both	in	Canada	and	in	the	
world.	Perhaps	most	striking	is	the	pace	of	globalization	of	the	economy	
and	the	labour	market	(McBride	2005).	Along	with	restrictions	and	
rollbacks	of	the	rights	of	unionized	and	nonunionized	workers	(Panitch	
and	Swartz	2003),	we	are	witness	to	a	constant	increase	in	economic	
polarization	(Olsen	2011;	Federation	of	Canadian	Municipalities	2008)	and	
the	pervasive	nature	of	precarious	work	(Burke	and	Shields	2000,	Vosko	
2000).	While	immigrants	and	racialized	groups	bear	the	brunt	of	the	most	
extreme	forms	of	temporary	and	precarious	labour	(Shields	2004;	Sassen	
1999),	the	new	rules	of	work	now	extend	even	to	young	professionals	who	
routinely	do	unpaid	with	the	hope	of	eventually	winning	the	right	to	paid	
employment.	Side‐by‐side	with	the	international	triumph	of	market	
economics	are	the	globalization	of	popular	struggles	and	the	
internationalization	of	political	issues	(Held	and	McGrew	2007;	Panitch	
and	Leys	2002).	The	opposition	to	the	two	Iraq	wars	and	military	
intervention	in	Afghanistan,	as	well	as	the	broad	support	for	militant	
environmentalism,	are	two	examples	that	come	to	mind.	
At	the	same	time	these	past	decades	have	been	defined	by	a	
relentless	ideological	assault	on	the	social	citizenship	rights	that	defined	
the	post‐World	War	II	social	contract	and	the	political	consensus	
represented	by	the	welfare	state	(Coutu	2006).	Citizens	are	now	construed	
as	little	more	than	consumers,	not	only	in	the	economic	marketplace	and	
labour	market,	but	also	as	members	of	civil	society	(Sears	2003).	Electoral	
campaigns	are	based	on	an	appeal	to	the	votes	of	these	“consumers”	for	
economic	bargains	through	reduced	taxes,	with	little	serious	public	
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discussion	of	the	consequences	in	terms	of	elimination	of	public	goods.	
Opposition	to	the	neoliberal	agenda	has	largely	been	transformed	from	
“inadvisable”	to	“impossible”,	and	alternative	agendas	removed	from	
consideration.	The	development	of	a	political	agenda	–	whether	broad	or	
narrow	–	requires	as	a	precondition	that	it	be	framed	in	terms	of	neoliberal	
values	of	reduced	government,	deficit	reduction,	and	the	predominance	of	
market	forces.	There	is	a	chilling	degree	of	truth	in	the	assertion	of	George	
Monbiot	(2007)	that	“We	are	all	neoliberals	now.”	
Accompanying	the	ideological	assault	of	neoliberalism	–	in	Canada	
at	least	–	has	been	a	shift	in	strategy	and	tactics	for	achieving	the	desired	
economic	and	political	transformation.	With	the	notable	exception	of	the	
Mike	Harris	“Common	Sense	Revolution”	in	Ontario	in	the	late	1990s,	and	
the	more	targeted	but	aggressive	attacks	on	BC	labour	in	1987	and	2000	
(Camfield	2006)	the	implementation	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	has	been	
characterized	less	by	frontal	assault	as	per	the	BC	Solidarity	era,	as	typified	
by	the	tactics	of	“first	wave	neoliberalism”	(Steger	and	Roy	2010),	and	
more	by	a	kind	of	relentless	incrementalism.	In	the	process	the	welfare	
state	has	come	to	be	gradually	“hollowed	out”	(Jessop	2002),	although	the	
façade	remains.		
One	of	the	lessons	of	the	BC	Solidarity	experience	for	the	right‐wing	
forces,	and	one	that	appears	to	have	had	great	impact,	was	that	a	frontal	
assault	approach,	while	not	totally	abandoned,	runs	a	considerable	risk	of	
radicalizing	the	popular	opposition.	From	proroguing	our	federal	
Parliament	at	the	convenience	of	a	minority	government,	to	gradual	
privatization	of	the	health	care	system	and	corporatization	of	the	
universities,	the	march	of	neoliberalism	has	been	steady	and	the	
accumulation	of	victories	impressive.	Particularly	striking	in	recent	years	
has	been	the	promotion	and	growth	of	the	military	and	police	apparatus	
within	government.	The	massive	investments	in	Canada’s	armed	forces	
and	the	criminalization	of	dissent	during	the	G20	protests	in	Toronto	in	
2010	provide	dramatic	proof	that	the	bloated	and	unproductive	portion	of	
government	that	the	neoliberals	want	to	eliminate	does	not	include	the	
apparatus	of	“law	and	order”	and	repression	(Paris	2011,	22‐30).	
The	Solidarity	experience	in	BC	in	1983	was	characterized	by	a	
frontal	assault	on	social	services,	union	rights	and	human	liberties.	The	
portrayal	of	this	assault	as	a	form	of	progress	towards	a	new	era	of	
economic	progress	and	political	liberty	was	an	important	aspect	of	the	
conflict,	and	one	that	would	grow	in	significance	throughout	Canada	for	
decades	to	come.	Significantly,	this	frontal	assault	developed	a	mass	and	
militant	extra‐parliamentary	resistance,	uniting	a	variety	of	both	working	
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class	and	middle	class	forces	against	the	government,	and	polarizing	
opposition	to	the	neoliberal	agenda	in	a	manner	that	would	not	soon	be	
forgotten.	However,	sustaining	the	unity,	let	alone	the	mobilization,	of	a	
popular	opposition	to	neoliberalism	has	been	made	particularly	
challenging	because	of	the	inability	of	popular	forces	to	develop	their	own	
counter	hegemonic	agenda	that	is	able	to	move	beyond	the	extremely	
limited	vision	of	the	now	dated	Keynesian	paradigm.		
	
Issues to Consider 
The	issues	posed	by	the	dominance	of	neoliberalism	are	vast.	Certainly	it	is	
far	beyond	our	capacity	in	this	or	any	single	article	to	categorize	them,	
much	less	to	provide	substantive	analysis.	In	the	spirit	of	reflection	and	
debate,	however,	let	us	suggest	three	topics	that	strike	us	as	particularly	
worthy	of	consideration	in	relation	to	the	BC	Solidarity	experience.	
First,	what	is	the	significance	of	the	global	nature	of	economic	
restructuring	and	resistance?	What	does	the	increasingly	globalized	nature	
of	the	struggle	against	neoliberalism	mean	for	developing	an	alternative	
political	vision?	What	are	the	implications	of	specific	trends	such	as	global	
ecopolitics,	and	international	anti‐war	mobilization?	What	is	the	effect	of	
ideological	trends	such	as	the	implicit	but	essentially	anarchist	nature	of	
global	solidarity	movements?	And	how	can	the	politically	and	
technologically	“wired”	nature	of	global	protest	be	used	to	shape	and	
strengthen	concrete	domestic	political	alternatives?	
More	locally,	what	is	the	role	of	community	organizations	in	the	
continuing	development	of	an	extra‐parliamentary	opposition	to	the	
imposition	of	the	neoliberal	agenda?	In	Ontario	in	particular	we	appear	to	
have	experienced	a	more	diffused	but	nevertheless	persistent	opposition	
to	neoliberalism	from	various	organizations	and	alliances	rooted	in	the	
community	services	sector.	To	what	extent	is	this	form	of	opposition	
rooted	in	a	different	political	economy	and	political	infrastructure,	
particularly	the	triumph	of	new	public	management	and	the	divesture	of	
state	services	to	contracted	community	organizations?	And	to	what	degree	
can	this	moderate	yet	persistent	opposition	continue	to	contribute	to	
resistance	to	the	neoliberal	agenda?	
Looking	more	globally	again,	what	can	we	say	at	this	point	in	the	
twenty‐first	century	about	the	link	between	socialism	and	democracy?	
Undoubtedly	work	must	continue	to	analyze	and	expose	the	links	between	
capitalist	globalization	and	the	degradation	of	workers’	rights,	general	
human	rights	and	the	environment.	At	the	same	time	we	must	admit	that	
neoliberalism	has	been	largely	successful	in	establishing	a	significant	
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popular	consensus	associating	individual	liberty	with	a	capitalist	economy.	
Perhaps	it	is	time	to	revisit	the	libertarian	ideals	of	the	Marxists	and	
anarchists	of	the	early	twentieth	century,	and	the	international	New	Left	of	
the	1960s	and	1970s,	in	order	to	re‐establish	the	credibility	of	the	socialist	
claim	to	freedom.	
	
Conclusion 
The	political	events	in	British	Columbia	formed	the	cutting	edge	of	the	
attack	by	the	new	right	in	Canada,	representing	a	local	expression	of	a	new	
politics	already	evinced	in	Thatcherism	and	Reagonomics.	That	scope	of	
the	challenge	posed	to	the	post‐war	social	contract	was	evident	in	the	1983	
Budget	of	the	governing	Social	Credit	Party.	The	immediate	result	was	a	
mobilization	and	politicization	of	popular	forces	in	defense	of	the	welfare	
state.	When	the	political	strike	action	by	Solidarity	achieved	a	measure	
denied	to	the	legislative	efforts	of	the	New	Democratic	Party,	an	end	was	
signaled	to	the	politics	of	consensus	and	the	channeling	of	popular	dissent	
into	parliamentary	processes.	Ultimately	however	Solidarity	offered	no	
broad	and	long‐term	alternative	vision	to	that	of	the	neoliberals,	and	the	
victories	of	the	movement	were	only	partial	and	time	limited.	The	
Solidarity	movement	was	characterized	essentially	by	a	broad‐based	and	
militant	“defensive	defiance”	which	only	limited,	or	postponed,	the	
achievement	of	neoliberal	economic	and	political	goals.	
With	some	notable	exceptions	like	the	Mike	Harris	years	in	the	late	
1990s	in	Ontario	(Camfield	2000),	the	imposition	of	the	neoliberal	agenda	
in	Canada	has	been	characterized	less	by	the	frontal	assault	of	the	BC	
Solidarity	period,	and	more	by	a	relentless	incrementalism	in	policy	and	
program.	At	the	same	time	the	alleged	necessity	of	these	incremental	
changes	finds	ever‐new	and	more	pervasive	justification	in	an	unrelenting	
ideological	assault	on	the	fundamental	notions	of	social	and	citizenship	
rights	beyond	the	limits	of	“free”	market	relations.	
This	situation	could	change	rapidly	of	course,	in	any	particular	
province,	or	for	Canada	as	a	whole.	The	neoliberal	forces	might	well	be	
sufficiently	heartened	by	examples	like	Cameron’s	agenda	(Seymour	2010;	
Hutton	and	Penny	2010)	in	the	United	Kingdom	to	return	to	a	strategy	of	
whole‐scale	frontal	assault	on	the	remnants	of	the	welfare	state	and	the	
related	rights	of	workers	and	citizens.	This	has	become	a	particular	greater	
possibility	in	the	context	of	the	return	to	“public	sector	austerity”	agenda	
resulting	from	the	global	financial	crisis	of	2007‐2008	(Albo	and	Evans	
2010).	But	for	now	at	least,	in	Canada,	it	would	appear	that	the	leaders	of	
the	neoliberal	crusade	are	content	to	patiently	implement	their	agenda	in	
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bits	and	pieces,	while	engineering	the	public	discourse	to	eliminate	the	
very	possibility	of	alternatives.	The	risk	of	large‐scale	class	and	social	
conflict	that	comes	with	the	alternative	agenda	of	frontal	assault	may	be	
judged	as	simply	too	great.	The	experience	of	the	Solidarity	movement	in	
BC	and	current	popular	mobilizations	against	austerity	may	well	be	
convincing	pieces	of	evidence	to	justify	this	conclusion.	
Under	these	conditions,	it	will	remain	exceedingly	difficult	for	
progressive	forms	to	move	beyond	a	series	of	defensive	struggles	in	
reaction	to	the	long	march	of	neoliberal	reform.	As	in	BC,	moving	beyond	a	
defensive	reaction	requires	not	only	leaders	with	credible	strategies	and	
practical	tactics,	but	also	the	energy	and	cohesion	provided	by	an	
alternative	vision.	Developing	such	a	vision	of	course	presents	enormous	
challenges,	especially	if	there	is	more	concern	with	popular	credibility	than	
political	correctness.	But	these	challenges	must	be	addressed	if	any	serious	
movement	to	block	and	ultimately	defeat	the	global	imposition	of	
neoliberalism	is	to	occur.	
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